acoustic Hack???

[Joe C]

They did use laptops, so the sounds from a desktop are not included in this

 

[TheDrunk]

They did use laptops, so the sounds from a desktop are not included in this

Good point,

I wonder if the sounds from laptop have a wider range of sounds...

 

[Yami]

Good point,

I wonder if the sounds from laptop have a wider range of sounds...

Not really, but plastic is far more transparent to RF than metal, and plastic is a much more common chassis material for laptops than desktops.

 

[1etherer]

They do make some very good points here with its use,

Install an attack app on your phone. Set up a meeting with the victim and place the phone on the desk next to his laptop (see Q2).

Break into the victim's phone, install the attack app, and wait until the victim inadvertently places his phone next to the target laptop.

Construct a web page use the microphone of the computer running the browser (using Flash or HTML Media Capture, under some excuse such as VoIP chat). When the user permits the microphone access, use it to steal the user's secret key.

Put your stash of eavesdropping bugs and laser microphones to a new use.

Send your server to a colocation facility, with a good microphone inside the box, and then acoustically extract keys from all nearby servers.

Get near a TEMPEST/1-92 protected machine, such as the one pictured to the right, place a microphone next to its ventilation holes, and extract its supposedly-protected secrets.

I think all of these are very do-able, and some easy to do so this is quite a threat..

They also point out that fans (on machines) and normal room noises are at a much lower frequencies so can be filtered out.

 

[1etherer]

They did use laptops, so the sounds from a desktop are not included in this

Quote from the research

Interestingly, many of the physical side-channel countermeasures used in highly sensitive applications, such as air gaps, Faraday cages, and power supply filters, provide no protection against acoustic leakage. In particular, Faraday cages containing computers require ventilation, which is typically provided by means of vents covered with perforated sheet metal or metal honeycomb (see Q1 above). These are very effective at attenuating compromising electromagnetic radiation (``TEMPEST''), but are nearly transparent to sound.

For example, the following depicts recording the acoustic emanations through a double-honeycomb metal ventilation mesh designed for blocking electromagnetic radiation. (Covering this mesh with cardboard eliminates the signal.)